Process Peace:

A New Evaluation Framework for Unofficial Diplomacy

by

Nathaniel D.F. Allen

Johns Hopkins University

&

Travis Keith Sharp

Princeton University

Revised: April 6, 2016

Process Peace:

A New Evaluation Framework for Track II Diplomacy

Abstract

Track II diplomacy, or unofficial interaction designed to assist or place pressure on official leaders, has become a supplement – and sometimes an alternative – to official diplomacy. Yet practitioners and scholars still debate its effectiveness. Many practitioners claim that Track II promotes peace but insist that its contributions are intangible and therefore difficult to assess empirically. However, some scholars maintain that empirical assessments are critical to better understanding the impact the Track II diplomacy has on conflict outcomes. This paper seeks to break this impasse in two ways. First, it provides a more comprehensive explanation of why Track II practitioners object to evaluation, drawing on personal interviews conducted in eight countries. Second, it proposes a new evaluation framework, which we call the "Process Peace" approach, which better balances practitioner and academic equities. Our framework should attract the interest of readers interested in bridging the gap between the practice and theory of negotiation.

Keywords

Track II; unofficial diplomacy; unofficial negotiation; measurement; effectiveness; evaluation; methodology

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, when Harvard psychologist Herbert Kelman's unofficial dialogue group helped foster the Oslo Accords, Track II diplomacy[1] has proliferated around the world (Montville 2006: 15-16; Kaye 2007: 1-2; Babbitt 2009: 544-546; Greig and Diehl 2012: 63; Hellman 2012: 591; Themnér and Wallensteen 2013).[2] Track II practitioners have attempted thousands of mediations since 1945 (Bohmelt 2010: 172). Governments and foundations have spent millions on these activities. During the 2002-2011 period, for example, U.S. non-governmental foundations together spent from $1.2 million to $3.9 million per year on Track II programs (Sharp 2013). Today, perhaps for the first time in history, Track II diplomacy has become a standard instrument in the peacemaker's repertoire.

The ascendance of Track II diplomacy is puzzling in light of one central fact: no one is sure whether it succeeds consistently in influencing conflict outcomes. Many longtime practitioners believe ardently in its efficacy. However, they have resisted using standard evaluation[3] methods to determine the conditions under which it works (Ball, Milner, and Taylor 2006: 182). As Track II pioneer Herbert Kelman puts it, "[T]he standard model of program evaluation, which seeks to examine the effects of an intervention on various relevant outcome measures, is neither appropriate nor feasible" (Kelman 2008: 30). Stephen Del Rosso, director of

[1] The standard definition of Track II diplomacy comes from Joseph Montville, who called it "non-structured, unofficial interaction […] which can therefore make its contribution as a supplement to the understandable shortcomings of official relations" (Montville & Davidson 1981: 155). We expound on our understanding of the concept in Section 3.

[2] The success of the Oslo accords popularized Track II diplomacy, but it was built on "interactive problem solving methods" pioneered by scholars such as Ronald Fisher, John Burton, Edward Azar, and Chris Mitchell in the late 1960s and 1970s. They first applied insights from social psychology to international conflict. For an excellent review of the historical development of the field, see Fisher (2002, 2005).

[3] We adopt the definition of evaluation used by Rossi et al. (1999: 16): "an evaluation is a systematic assessment of policies, programs, or institutions with respect to their conception and implementation as well as the impact and utilization of their results."

international peace and security at the Carnegie Corporation, a major funder of Track II projects, describes Track II as "impervious to standard metrics of program evaluation" (Jones 2015).

Some scholars and funders have tried to overcome practitioners' concerns by arguing that the lack of serious evaluation slows the progression of Track II (Kaye 2013; Fisher 2002: 76; Rouhana 1995: 265; Jones 2015: 164). A number of recent empirical studies have conducted more systematic, comparative analyses (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006a; Böhmelt 2010; Capie 2010; Kellen, Bekerman, and Maoz 2012). However, in their comprehensive review of the field, Wallensteen and Svensson (2014) conclude that "the particular conditions under which mediation is effective are still debated […] There is […] no consensus among researchers and practitioners as to which strategy is used the most and which is most effective" (315, 319).

In short, the practitioner's ambition to build peace, the scholar's ambition to search for empirical evidence, and the funder's ambition to achieve efficiency are at odds over the issue of Track II's effectiveness.[4] This impasse has inhibited progress because both practitioners and scholars need each other. Scholars cannot analyze Track II's effectiveness without the rich information supplied by practitioners, and practitioners cannot allocate their time and resources wisely without feedback on effectiveness from scholars.

In this paper, we attempt to break the practitioner-academic deadlock in two ways. First, we provide a more comprehensive explanation of why Track II practitioners view evaluation methods skeptically. Based on a review of the secondary literature, interviews conducted with Track II participants in the United States, Norway, Sweden, Israel, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Qatar, and Japan, and experience as participant-observers at the U.S. Department of State and U.S.

[4] We recognize that the distinction between a practitioner and a scholar may be illusory, particularly since Track II diplomacy features so many practitioner-scholars. We use the distinction here as a heuristic device.

Department of Defense in 2013, we identify seven principal objections to evaluation. These include *conceptual* objections about 1) measurement, 2) cross-case comparability, and 3) isolating effects; *organizational* concerns about 4) curtailed practitioner autonomy, 5) limited institutional capacity, and 6) the lack of information about costs; and *ethical* concerns over 7) the release of participant identities.

Our second contribution to breaking the deadlock is the creation of a new evaluation framework, the "Process Peace" approach, which better balances practitioner and academic equities. Unlike existing frameworks in the literature, which do not address several of the practitioner objections listed above, our framework addresses all seven. As a result, practitioners should be more likely to use our framework, which will advance practitioners and scholars' shared goals of peacemaking and truth-seeking.

This essay belongs solidly in the middle position between practitioners skeptical of measurement efforts and methodologically-inclined scholars. Previous studies have debated whether Track II evaluations can systematically measure and compare across cases (Saunders 2000; Rouhana 2000). Our position is similar to the one Jones (2015) stakes out in his new book, which will likely become the definitive text on Track II. Jones argues that "there must be some basic tools and concepts with which the field can measure its activities," but that evaluators must use "common sense" and recognize that "no two projects are exactly comparable" (137, 163). Our paper advances Jones work by exploring these "basic tools and concepts" in greater detail.

By proposing a new framework, we do not wish to imply that ours is the last word on Track II evaluation. We hope our framework will contribute to, but certainly not decide, important debates concerning how to define, measure, conceptualize, and evaluate Track II diplomacy. Nor do we believe that our framework provides a unifying, cross-cutting methodology for evaluating

every kind of Track II activity, though we do argue that it goes further than existing frameworks in specifying what types of evaluation strategies are most appropriate for typical Track II scenarios. Rather, our objective in proposing this framework is twofold. First, we seek to demonstrate that there is a greater role for external evaluation of Track II diplomacy than many believe. Second, more collaboration between Track II practitioners and skilled evaluators will help generate broader insights into how to resolve tragic conflicts.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 summarizes the debate surrounding the effectiveness of Track II. Section 2 outlines seven principal challenges to the effective evaluation of Track II. Drawing on this analysis, Section 3 reconciles these concerns with the requirements of rigorous evaluation. We present the results of this reconciliation, our new "Process Peace" framework, in Section 4. Finally, a brief conclusion summarizes the implications for future research.

Section 1. Debating the Effectiveness of Track II

Practitioners have accumulated a large and growing body of evidence that Track II promotes peace. Though the evidence tends to be case-specific, it is impressive nonetheless (Lieberfeld 2002; Fisher 2005). The groundwork for the Oslo Accords was laid by Track II problem-solving workshops among influential Palestinians and Israelis, who eventually became official negotiators (Egeland 2009; Cuhadar and Dayton 2012).[5] Harold Saunders's (2003) Inter-Tajik Dialogue facilitated negotiated resolution to a civil war in Tajikistan. The Conflict Management Group's "brain-storming sessions" helped end conflict between the Republic of Georgia and the breakaway province of South Ossetia (Fitzgerald 1998: 6). The Catholic

[5] Some scholars disagree with this standard narrative (Waage 2013), but there is little dispute that Track II mediation went mainstream in the aftermath of Oslo.

Community of Sant'Egidio mediated the end to a civil war in Mozambique (Bartoli 1999). More recently, unofficial talks between senior Iranian and U.S. officials facilitated the agreement between the United States and Iran concerning the Iranian nuclear program (Allen, Sharp et al. 2014: 7-8; Jones 2014).

Though striking, many of these case studies share a common limitation: they only examine Track II successes. By omitting examples of failure, they do not provide the type of analytical leverage traditionally required to draw broader conclusions (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).[6] Moreover, by not analyzing failure, these case studies miss an important opportunity to provide future scholars and practitioners with lessons learned.[7]

To address this issue, analysts have employed more structured methods to evaluate mediation – though relatively few have assessed Track II per se (Beardsley 2008b: 647).[8] Several studies have used the comparative method to analyze Track II's successes and failures (Lieberfeld 1999, 2007; Agha et al. 2003; Kaye 2007; Cuhadar 2009; Hirschfeld 2014). Malhotra and Liyanage (2005) use a pre- and post-treatment survey to show that Track II participants exhibit more empathy for their interlocutors a full year after the dialogue. Capie (2010) compares the ASEAN-Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). He finds that "track two may require an unusual window of opportunity to have influence on policy makers" (307). In another

[6] For an alternative view, see Goertz and Mahoney (2012).

[7] Though less common, some scholar-practitioners have made admirable attempts to review the negative as well as positive aspects of their interventions. Leonard Doob and William Foltz's discussion of the defection of their deputies during the 1972 Belfast workshops illuminates the challenges inherent in communicating with foreign intermediaries and preparing Track II participants (Doob and Foltz 1973, 508-510).

[8] In the broader mediation literature not focused specifically on Track II, scholars have evaluated how mediation outcomes are affected by: 1) culture (Bakaki, Bohmelt, and Bove 2015); 2) the intensity of the conflict and the strategy employed (Bercovitch and Langley 1993; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003; Bercovitch and Gartner 2006b); 3) indirect social ties (Bohmelt 2009); 4) the nature of the mediation coalition, including bias, coordination, and insider status (Bohmelt 2011; Svensson and Lindgren 2013; Lundgren and Svensson 2014; Svensson 2015); and 5) the "ripeness" of the dispute (Zartman 1985; Haas 1990; Stedman 1991).

important paper, Bohmelt (2010) finds that mediation combining Tracks I and II are more highly correlated with successful conflict resolution efforts than mediation efforts using only one mediation strategy, a result that echoes Fisher (2006). Kellen, Bekerman, and Maoz (2012) take another step forward by using transcript analysis to demonstrate that Track II diplomacy can create a shared identity among Israeli and Palestinian participants. However, that shared identity can hinder peacemaking later if the participants are perceived as outsiders by their countrymen, a problem known as re-entry (Walton 1970; Mitchell 1980; Azar and Burton 1986; Kelman 2000; Oetzel and Ting-Toomey 2006; Jones 2015).

The literature on Track II's effectiveness clearly continues to make progress. Yet a rift remains between the detailed success stories shared by practitioners and the more contingent generalizations produced by scholars. Wallensteen and Svensson (2014: 324) acknowledge this disconnect, noting the "need for more bridge-building between practitioners and researchers to make [mediation] research useful in a world which is still full of significant conflicts of different types." This paper aims to help build that bridge, and we start in the next section by exploring practitioners' concerns about evaluation.

Section 2. Understanding Skepticism about Evaluation

Drawing on interviews in eight countries, experience as participant-observers in the U.S. government, and a review of the literature, we find seven principal objections to Track II diplomacy evaluation efforts. Three *conceptual* objections, which are evident from the existing scholarship and commonly cited by Track II practitioners, include the extent to which Track II efforts are measurable, comparable across cases, and possess observable effects. Scholars and practitioners have previously discussed these objections and potential ways to address them. In addition, our interviews and participant observations revealed three *organizational* objections

consistently mentioned by Track II participants but virtually absent from the scholarly debate. These include that demands for evaluation can impose inappropriate constraints on creativity and risk-taking, that the costs of undertaking evaluation are often prohibitive, and, from the perspective of funders, that insufficient information exists on the costs and benefits of Track II. A final objection raised by both scholars and practitioners concerns the extent to which Track II evaluation efforts can be *ethically* implemented.

Figure 1 summarizes how these three types of objections vary in terms of their previous articulation by scholars and practitioners, intended audiences, and tractability using standard evaluation techniques. Conceptual objections are raised both by scholars and practitioners, are treated in detail in the literature, and are at least partially addressed by standard evaluation techniques. Organizational objections have not to our knowledge been raised publicly either by scholars or practitioners, but were a frequent theme in our interviews with participants. Because they are not as widely known, standard evaluation methods do little to address these concerns. Ethical objections concerning protecting the confidentiality and safety of participants were primarily raised by practitioners as well, and are only partially dealt with in standard evaluation practice. We now address each of these three kinds of objections in greater detail, discuss the extent to which standard evaluation methods address them, and advance several arguments for how to address them more comprehensively.

Figure 1. Practitioners' Objections to Evaluation: Conceptual, Organizational, and Ethical

Objection Type	Articulated publicly by Track II facilitators?	Appeals primarily to?	Tractable with standard evaluation methods?
Conceptual	Yes	Scholars	Partially
Organizational	No	Other Track II facilitators	No
Ethical	Yes	Track II participants	Partially

Conceptual Objections: Measurement, Comparability, Isolating Effects

Skeptics express three conceptual objections about the evaluability of Track II. The first and most frequent objection is that the outcomes of Track II are difficult to measure. Saunders asserts that most Track II projects do not lead to specific outcomes (Saunders 2000, 2013). "It's devilishly difficult to measure the results," Saunders notes, adding that Track II amounts to "the production of ideas" which are valuable because "Policy is rarely made on paper. Instead, it's a continuously changing mix of people and ideas." Bruce Koepke, a senior researcher at SIPRI with years of experience in Afghanistan, maintains that Track II activities "are very expensive and do not demonstrate progress like projects do, for example, building schools" (Koepke 2013). Determining the right time to measure outcomes has also proven problematic. Peter Jones observes: "Those funding Track II should not expect projects which seek to 'change' policy in a short time frame, but rather those which seek to lay the groundwork for rapid progress when change happens" (Jones 2013). Bolstering this distinction between short- and long-term effects, a pair of important studies by Beardsley (2008a, 2011) showed how mediation can succeed today but fail tomorrow if the two sides prioritize agreement over resolution.

Measuring Track II is a challenging endeavor. Nevertheless, standard evaluation methods do offer some promising tools and techniques. First, though Track II dialogues can lead to a

variety of results, more systematic attempts could be made to define and measure some of the more common results or outcomes. In addition to the “production of ideas” cited by Saunders, our interviewees cited conducting effective mediation, building relationships, and changing perceptions as the most common immediate results of Track II. These outcomes could provide a starting point for future discussions of measurement, a point we return to later.

Standard evaluation approaches tend to distinguish between *outcomes* achieved and how those outcomes lead to the *results*, *impacts,* or *objectives* desired (Bass et al. 2012; NORAD 1999). Scholars such as Rouhana (2000) have made similar contrasts between “micro-objectives” and “macro-goals” in Track II diplomacy. Such distinctions allow researchers to differentiate between the immediate results of a Track II dialogue and Track II’s longer-term effects. Even when Track II dialogues do influence conflict outcomes directly, the dialogues often work in concert with other factors such as a conflict’s “ripeness” or a political transition (Zartman 1985). Differentiating between Track II *outcomes* and *impacts* gives the researcher flexibility in defining what constitutes success and evaluating the contribution of a particular Track II process to a larger conflict.

A second conceptual objection is that each Track II activity is unique, making it difficult to compare across cases.[9] Jon Pedersen, managing director of Norway’s Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, which helped facilitate the negotiations that led to the Oslo Accords, remarked, “It’s difficult to go back and reconstruct” how decisions are made, which makes it challenging to conduct effectiveness studies (Pedersen 2013). Jones’s (2015: 161) central argument about evaluation is that “As a practitioner I have found it critical to evaluate each project *on its own terms*.” Track II’s apparent lack of comparability is worsened by the

[9] This is the problem of unit homogeneity (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

conceptual and definitional ambiguities which pervade the field and make it hard to perform controlled comparisons (Jones 2015: 12-24).

Since these ambiguities are a problem, better defining Track II's key outputs and distinguishing between outcomes and impacts will help improve comparability. Moreover, as with much social science research, scholars and practitioners evaluating Track II face a trade-off between parsimony and explanatory power. Generalized comparative methods may explain a broader class of cases but fail to capture all the factors present in every case (Van Evera 1997: 18-19). So long as researchers are clear about their goals, the field should pursue generalized and particularized explanations simultaneously, since the two approaches are complementary.

Several extant studies employ quantitative and qualitative comparative methods to evaluate the effectiveness of conflict resolution efforts, including Track II dialogue (Lieberfeld 1999, 2007; Agha et al. 2003; Kaye 2007; Cuhadar 2009; Bohmelt 2010; Hirschfeld 2014). More of this type of research is needed. Future large-N studies, for example, might examine the extent to which the effectiveness of mediation efforts depends on ripeness, which would require the prospective analyst to wade through the history of past conflicts to define and code precisely when they became ripe. Analysts could use general comparative methods or experiments to test the effectiveness of different mediators or mediation techniques. As Rouhana points out, though it would be unethical to implement experiments by randomly assigning mediators to various Track II dialogues, or participants to various mediators, scholars might simulate these techniques in a college setting with university students (Rouhana 2000: 319-321).

A third conceptual objection is that only intractable conflicts attract Track II diplomacy, so any failure to observe a positive outcome may mean only that the dispute was intense, not that

Track II was worthless.[10] Conversely, because Track II participants are often politically-active elites within their societies, they often engage in multiple activities that could affect their thinking about a conflict. For this reason, any observed positive outcome may be attributable to something other than Track II (Kelman 2008: 40).

Standard evaluation methods can help researchers isolate causal effects. Certain statistical models can, for example, control for the "selection effects" problem of sampling only intractable conflicts (Beber 2012). However, no software program can solve the thorny problem of separating multiple Track II outcomes into reasonable comparison groups. Researchers who seek to isolate the effects of Track II dialogues will have to focus on particular outcomes, rely on interviews with participants, and use careful process tracing to make their case.

In sum, standard evaluation methods only partially address these three conceptual objections. We have suggested a few areas for improvement. Yet standard evaluation methods will neither elucidate a "grand" theory of Track II nor quantify all the diverse mechanisms, conditions, and circumstances through which Track II succeeds or fails in influencing conflict outcomes. These methods can, however, improve our knowledge of these factors.

Organizational Objections: Autonomy, Institutional Capacity, Costs

Practitioners almost never publicly articulate their organizational obstacles to evaluation. Yet our personal experience working in government and think tanks has taught us the importance of these factors. We use the term organizational here to mean objections related to the practical implementation of Track II such as conditionality on the part of funders, limited resources, and lack of information about costs and benefits.

[10] This is the problem of selection effects (Fearon 1994).

Behind closed doors, practitioners voice several organizational objections to evaluation. The first relates to funding, the lifeblood of Track II dialogues. Many practitioners feel that funders impose evaluation in ways that are inappropriate. Reflecting this sentiment, practitioners tend to discuss evaluation in the context of obtaining funding, a juxtaposition which implies that their interest in evaluation is instrumental and involuntary. To his credit, Kelman (2008: 37) admits this explicitly: "Evaluation […] should not be a condition for the practice of interactive conflict resolution. It becomes necessary, however, when practitioners seek to persuade funding agencies to support their efforts." Jones (2015: 162) remarks that the Canadian government's use of results-based evaluation when reviewing grant applications has "stultified the creativity and risk-taking which are the hallmarks of Track Two" and is generally "frustrating and distorting." One can sympathize with these concerns about future funding. More contenders seek Track II funding today than ever before, governments and foundations face budgetary constraints due to the troubled economy, and funders often demand "results-based" evidence. Definitional and measurement ambiguities have caused confusion over what "results-based" evidence should look like in the case of Track II diplomacy.

A second organizational objection concerns the ability of Track II facilitators to conduct evaluation, given their limited resources and conflicts of interest. Again, Kelman (2008: 39) is explicit: "The time has come for me to confess that, in the more than 30 years that I have been engaged in developing interactive problem solving, building its theoretical foundations, and practicing it, I have not engaged in systematic research designed to evaluate its effectiveness." He characterizes his failure to conduct evaluation – even though he is trained to do so – as a function of conceptual and ethical objections, plus his judgment that running high-quality Track II dialogues took so much time, effort, and money that there was little left over for evaluation.

This sentiment of limited organizational capacity is common among practitioners, who also doubt the ability of third-party evaluators to assess the contributions of Track II without immersing themselves in the dialogues (Saunders 2000).

These concerns are valid but not insurmountable obstacles to evaluation. One central issue is the standard for "success," which lies at the heart of practitioners' concern about how evaluation could impinge on their risk-taking and creativity. Though some funders might wish to evaluate Track II dialogues based solely on whether they resolve conflicts, this is unreasonable because, as discussed earlier, Track II initiatives often take time to work and require other supporting conditions to succeed. What practitioners should be held accountable for are the dialogue's immediate outcomes, such as the generation of new ideas, building relationships, and changing perceptions.

Likewise, limited organizational capacity need not impede fair, transparent and effective evaluation. For example, practitioners can fix evaluation expenses at a percentage of overall program expenses. In international development, most donors recommend that 5 to 10 percent of a program's budget should support monitoring and evaluation. Other evaluation approaches could minimize the demands on a facilitator's time. For example, an outside evaluator, funded by Track II grant makers, could work with a facilitator to design a relatively short questionnaire to be administered over the course of the workshop. We have included an example of such a questionnaire as Appendix 1.

Of course, as Saunders (2000) points out, practitioners face a trade-off between the overall expense of the evaluation and the level of immersion of a potential evaluator. He implies that facilitators might consider embedding an evaluator in the Track II process as an observer. This would alleviate facilitators of the burden of administering evaluation. However, the politics

of adding an embedded evaluator would have to be handled deftly. More rigorous evaluations might involve multiple surveys and longer questionnaires. Those specially trained on data entry and collection could implement these techniques.

In principle, both facilitator-led and outsider-led evaluation seem plausible. In practice, however, the former probably represents the best option since practitioners dislike bringing in outsiders. Collaboration between evaluation specialists and Track II facilitators on questionnaire design should mitigate Saunders' concern about the need for evaluators to be "immersed" in the dialogue. Practitioners could even design the first draft of questionnaires themselves.

Track II funders often raise a third and final organizational objection to evaluation: the absence of reliable data on Track II costs, which precludes performing basic cost-effectiveness calculations which might offer a fairer basis for evaluation. U.S. governmental and non-governmental organizations serve as a case in point. The government agencies most likely to fund Track II projects – the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense (DoD) – do not tabulate Track II spending in their budget request documents or outlay databases (Sharp 2013). The State Department and USAID recently unveiled the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, an online database of government-wide foreign assistance spending, but even this powerful tool excludes systematic Track II data. "It would be practically impossible to put a dollar amount on 'Track II' funds," observes Lori Groves Rowley, a former senior staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who oversaw U.S. foreign assistance policy. "I wonder if you could even get agreement on what activities would specifically fall under the definition," she adds (Groves Rowley 2013). For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce sometimes helps train foreign small business owners how to trade in U.S. markets, a Track II-style activity that the department might not report or classify as Track II. Likewise, in their publicly available

Internal Revenue Service disclosures, U.S. foundations and NGOs tend to report their spending by program or project, not by activity, so Track II figures do not appear systematically.

Any concerted effort to generate better data about Track II spending will have to start with major funders, not with practitioners. Given their lack of transparency about costs, funders are being disingenuous when they criticize Track II dialogues for lacking cost-benefit calculations. The only attempt we are aware of to estimate overall spending on Track II by major U.S. foundations yielded a figure of between $1 and $4 million annually (Allen, Sharp et al 2013: 25-26). Compared to spending on other major diplomatic or defense initiatives, which can cost hundreds of millions or billions of dollars, the potential benefits of Track II appear to be well worth the relatively small costs.

Ethical Objections: Protecting Participants

A final objection commonly raised by practitioners and infrequently cited in the literature concerns whether Track II can be ethically evaluated. Practitioners sometimes argue publicly that evaluation threatens their need to protect identities and activities within a Track II dialogue. As Kelman (2008: 33) writes "confidentiality was particularly important for the protection of the participants, because the mere fact that they were meeting with the enemy was controversial and exposed them to political, legal, and even physical risks." Some Track II participants are wary of leaving written records because they may face reprisals in their home countries, which raises the question of how to protect participants while still evaluating efficacy (D'Estrée et al. 2001). Ethical objections appeal primarily to Track II participants whose personal safety will be at risk should things go wrong.

Despite practitioners' misgivings, standard evaluation methods do provide extensive confidentiality and secrecy to participants (D'Estrée 2001: 108-109; Church and Shouldice 2003:

15-16). Track II evaluations should comply with the guidelines already used in research on human subjects, which include obtaining the informed consent of participants, carefully weighing the benefits versus the risks of potential research, and keeping data secret through encryption or other methods (Wood 2006; Belmont Report 1978). All research involving Track II should be subject to the approval of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), independent reviewers who work with researchers to ensure that subjects are treated ethically and who specialize in assessing the potential harm to human subjects.

Nevertheless, given the sensitive nature of Track II diplomacy and the high-stakes nature of the work, standard methods might not be good enough for some Track II participants. To further alleviate these concerns, some have suggested establishing a code of conduct that clarifies the responsibilities of conflict resolution evaluators, which could be developed by an umbrella organization of such evaluators (Church and Shouldice 2003: 16). Track II practitioners could also learn from the practices of researchers who work interviewing subjects in active conflict zones. To protect the confidentiality of her subjects, who were participants of an active insurgency in El Salvador, Elizabeth Wood relied on an oral informed consent procedure, and at times did not record either her interviews nor the names of her subjects in order to ensure their safety (Wood 2006: 381). With close collaboration between practitioners and researchers, it should be possible to devise evaluation procedures, which might differ from dialogue to dialogue, that adequately address practitioners' concerns regarding the safety of their participants.

Section 3. Building a Practitioner-Friendly Framework

In the previous section, we identified seven conceptual, organizational, and ethical objections that comprise the main arguments against evaluation. Having suggested ways to

address the ethical objection, we devote the rest of the paper to addressing the conceptual and organizational concerns. This leaves us with six "core" objections:

1. Difficulty of measurement (conceptual objection)
2. Lack of comparability across cases (conceptual objection)
3. Difficulty of isolating effects (conceptual objection)
4. Skepticism about third-party evaluators (organizational objection)
5. Limited institutional capacity to conduct evaluation (organizational objection)
6. Lack of data on costs (organizational objection)

In this section, we analyze in greater detail how three existing evaluation frameworks – Multi-Step, Action Evaluation, and the D'Estrée Framework – accommodate these six core objections. We find numerous areas for improvement, which we then incorporate into our new "Process Peace" framework in Section 4. We selected the three existing frameworks to include based on a review of the most developed models in the field (Gurkaynak, Dayton, Paffenholz 2009; Paffenholz and Reychler 2005; Fast and Neufeldt 2005; Corell and Betsill 2008). We only considered what Gurkaynak et al. call "overall frameworks and methodologies," which focus on general methods for assessing peacebuilding initiatives (Gurkaynak, Dayton, Paffenholz 2009: 292).

Existing Frameworks

Multi-Step Evaluation: Kelman, Saunders, and Fisher have all developed similar evaluation frameworks which involve breaking Track II interventions into distinct phases and then assessing the effectiveness of each phase (Kelman 2008; Saunders 2011; Fisher 2014). We call this the "Multi-Step" framework. Kelman's framework features nine phases, while Saunders's offers five and Fisher's includes eight (Jones 2015: 160). While we will not compare and contrast these frameworks at length since readers can consult the original works, we find that each offers a unique and worthwhile way to conceptualize the process through which Track II

dialogues may help resolve conflicts. These scholars agree that the purpose of Track II dialogues is transfer, which Fisher (2005: 3) defines as "how effects (e.g. attitudinal changes, new realizations) and outcomes (e.g. frameworks for negotiation) are moved from the unofficial interventions to the official domain of decision and policy making." They envision transfer as being a two-step process: it first occurs within a Track II dialogue and then spreads beyond it. They advocate using different evaluation tools to assess the different "links in the chain" (Kelman 2008: 43).

The Multi-Step framework addresses some, but not all, of practitioners' six core objections. On the plus side, it allows Track II facilitators to control the process of defining goals and developing metrics for each step, which should alleviate concerns about measurement (#1) and skepticism about third-party evaluators (#4). Facilitators with limited institutional capacity (#5) also may be able to use the Multi-Step approach, depending on how many phases they analyze and how intensively. On the negative side, however, the Multi-Step framework is so flexible and laborious that it dis-incentivizes cross-case comparability (#2) and the isolation of Track II effects (#3).[11] It also does not address the issue of costs (#6).

<u>Action Evaluation</u>: Developed by Ross (2001) and Rothman (1997), the "Action Evaluation" framework combines computer- and facilitator-based interactions to assess three stages of a Track II intervention: the baseline, formative, and summative stages (Rothman and Friedman 2002: 286). In the baseline stage, an "action evaluator" collects data on the goals of the participants and stakeholders, then re-presents that information to participants in a synthesized format. During the next step, the formative stage, participants refine their goals

[11] The Multi-Step framework's weaknesses as a causal explanation are similar to the weaknesses of the "policy cycles" literature (Lasswell 1956; Brewer 1974). For a summary of the weaknesses of policy cycles explanations, see Weible (2014).

based on feedback and develop detailed plans to achieve (and measure) them. Finally, during the summative stage, participants "take stock of their progress" by judging how well they have met their refined goals (Rothman and Friedman 2002: 286).

Action Evaluation is especially good at responding to revised goals, an important feature for evaluating Track II dialogues that often meander in unplanned – but productive – directions. For this reason, like the Multi-Step framework, Action Evaluation accommodates practitioner concerns about measurement (#1) and skepticism about evaluation (#4). Because Action Evaluation features only three stages (versus five or more for the Multi-Stage framework) and outsources data aggregation to a computer program, it generally demands less institutional capacity (#5) than the Multi-Stage approach (although finding a trained action evaluator might prove challenging). However, Action Evaluation shares the Multi-Stage framework's weaknesses related to cross-case comparability (#2), the isolation of Track II effects (#3), and the incorporation of costs (#6).

D'Estrée Framework: Tamra Pearson d'Estrée and her colleagues have developed a framework which combines three phases (promotion, application, and sustainability), three levels of impact (micro, meso, macro), and four types of change (changes in representation, changes in relations, foundations for transfer, and foundations for outcome/implementation). During the initial promotion phase, evaluators should make an "in-the-room assessment" about whether the Track II dialogue is affecting the participants (2001: 108). D'Estrée and her colleagues list several indicators which demonstrate a change of perception among participants, including "attitude change," "empathy," "validation and re-conceptualization of identity" and "perceptions of possibility" (2001: 106). The next phase, application, asks evaluators to do a short-term assessment focused on whether Track II participants "bring home" what they learned to their

communities (2001: 108). The final phase, sustainability, covers the medium- and longer-term question of whether observed changes last.

The D'Estrée Framework possesses the same strengths as Action Evaluation; namely, it alleviates practitioner concerns about measurement (#1), skepticism regarding evaluation (#4), and institutional capacity (#5). However, it surpasses Action Evaluation by offering ample cross-case comparability (#2) in the form of its four types of change. By narrowing the universe of possible changes to these four, the D'Estrée Framework allows researchers to match similar Track II interventions and execute multi-case comparisons. Despite these strengths, the D'Estrée Framework does not solve the problems of isolating Track II effects (#3) or incorporating costs (#6).

In sum, we find several key components of Track II which current evaluation frameworks do not address or do not address particularly well. First, two of three frameworks reviewed do not work particularly well for cross-case comparison. Second, none of the existing frameworks specify methods for isolating the effects of particular Track II initiatives. Finally, no existing framework explicitly considers how to address the question of incorporating costs.

The existing frameworks further fail to make two kinds of distinctions. First, they fail to specify which methodologies are most suited to answering particular Track-II related research questions. Second, they fail to identify whether funders, practitioners, or scholars should evaluate these questions. We believe that Track II practitioners such as Saunders, Kelman and Jones are right that funders should allow practitioners to adopt flexible, multi-stage evaluation frameworks which facilitate detailed assessments of specific Track II initiatives. We also, however, believe that there should be space for researchers to make broader generalizations through qualitative or quantitative comparisons of multiple Track II initiatives. Scholars are best positioned to address

some of the broader questions concerning transfer, policy impact, and the overall contribution of Track II initiatives to conflict resolution.

Section 4. The Process Peace Framework

In this section we present our new "Process Peace" evaluation framework, which is depicted in **Figure 2**. We first outline our basic *input-activity-output-outcome-impact* structure. Since inputs and activities are fairly straightforward, we only explore outputs, outcomes, and impacts, which we discuss in turn. We pay special attention to measuring outputs, a task that often falls to Track II practitioners. Our analysis includes suggestions for isolating Track II effects and incorporating costs, the two key deficiencies in the best existing framework by D'Estrée. The section concludes by briefly summarizing the advantages of our approach (**Figure 3**).

Figure 2: Process Peace Evaluation Framework

	Outputs	Outcomes	Impacts
Indicators	Idea Generation Building Relationships Effective Mediation Changing Perceptions	Official Participation/Observation Officials Informed Directly Officials Informed Indirectly Officials Are Pressured (e.g. by Media)	Observed Behavior Official Confirmation
Measurement Strategies	Surveys (Experimental, Quasi-Experimental, Pre/Post, Qualitative) Key Informant Interviews Focus Groups	Key informant interviews Media Analysis Documentation of Official Pressure	Case Studies Comparative Analysis Large-N analyses with conflicts or media efforts as observations
Primary Implementers	Funders Practitioners	Funders Practitioners Scholars / Research Community	Funders Scholars / Research Community

Structure: Inputs, Activities, Outputs, Outcomes, Impacts

The most common approaches in modern evaluation, such as log-frame analyses and theories of change, first define the *actors* or *inputs* involved, the *activities* undertaken, the *outcomes* achieved, and how these outcomes lead to the *results*, *impacts,* or *objectives* desired (see, for example, Bass et al. 2012; Funnel & Rogers 2011; Schmidt 2009; NORAD 1999). We use a familiar five-stage process which generally unfolds in sequence: inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts (Bloom 2005). Following Parsons et al. (2013: 5), *inputs* are the raw materials that create Track II diplomacy, such as funding, expertise, relationships, and personnel. *Activities* are the actions taken by Track II facilitators during a dialogue to pursue various goals. *Outputs* are the tangible and intangible micro-level changes that result from Track II activities. *Outcomes* are the benefits that a Track II project is designed to deliver. Finally, *impacts* are higher-level strategic goals, such as implementing new approaches to resolve conflict.

Within the Track II community, Rouhana (2000: 297) conducted the most definitive analysis of the relationship between Track II activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts. In distinction to Rouhana's approach, we define a third linkage in the causal chain, outcomes, as mechanisms which directly link Track II outputs to the official policy process, typically a necessary condition for achieving conflict resolution (Kelman 2008; Fisher 2014).

Our framework balances practitioners' concerns about measurement and uniqueness (objection #1), with the social science imperative to make broad, comparative, and more generalized inferences (objection #2). In addition, our framework makes a clearer distinction between facilitators' and practitioners' responsibilities (outputs) versus those beyond their

control (outcomes and particularly impacts). Scholars and perhaps funders can best evaluate these uncontrollable factors through quantitative and qualitative research. By better stipulating responsibilities, our approach should ameliorate some practitioner concerns about third-party evaluation (objection #4).

Outputs: Idea Generation, Building Relationships, Neutral Mediation, Changing Perceptions

In our personal interviews and review of the literature, Track II practitioners most frequently invoked four reasons why Track II succeeds: 1) idea generation, 2) building relationships, 3) effective mediation, and 4) changing perceptions (Church and Shouldice 2003: 38). We consider these outputs of Track II. In social science terms, each of these outputs is a hypothesized causal mechanism that eventually leads to the resolution of conflict. Because our framework stipulates these four distinct causal mechanisms, it provides the type of cross-case comparability that builds knowledge (objection #2). The D'Estrée Framework also offers comparability in the form of her four types of change.[12] However, her types tend to blur outputs, outcomes, and impacts, which obscure accurate evaluation. Our framework represents an improvement because our four outputs are more distinct, concrete, and measurable.

Not every one of these outputs must emerge from a Track II initiative to count it as a "success." Some Track II initiatives may generate ideas but not significantly influence perceptions. Others may build relationships and change perceptions but not generate many new ideas. Less successful dialogues would likely fail to achieve any of the four outputs outlined above, while more successful dialogues will achieve at least two. In our estimation, using

[12] The D'Estrée Framework's four types of change are: changes in representation, changes in relations, foundations for transfer, and foundations for outcome/implementation.

multiple indicators for success does not militate against comparison but facilitates it by offering a structured means of defining success and demonstrating causation.

Idea Generation: Practitioners argue that the confidential, unofficial nature of Track II diplomacy allows participants to brainstorm more freely without hewing to their side's official negotiating position. According to Montville, "Track II diplomacy is a process designed to assist official leaders [...] by exploring possible solutions out of public and without the requirements of formal negotiation or bargaining for advantage" (1987: 162-63). Hottinger (2005: 58) suggests that Track II facilitators "are less threatening to armed groups, work flexibly, unofficially, and off-the-record, and have less to be concerned about in terms of conveying official/legal recognition." The unofficial character of Track II peacemaking "provides opportunities for participants to devise new negotiating options, including ideas that may be too bold or suggestive in a Track I setting" (Smock 1998: iii).

Building Relationships: Practitioners assert that Track II enables participants to gain one another's trust in ways that are impossible for official negotiators (Rouhana 2000). Building relationships can entail not only increasing trust among individuals, but also decreasing animosity towards the larger parties that those individuals represent. Diamond and McDonald suggest that Track II should "decrease tension, anger, fear, or misunderstanding by humanizing the 'face of the enemy' and giving people direct personal experience of one another" (1996: 2). A major U.S. Institute of Peace report assessed numerous Track II efforts, concluding that "the interaction permitted in private settings helps overcome the isolation characteristic of official negotiations and provides opportunities to build trust among adversaries" (Smock: iii-iv). During the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, Saunders (2003: 87) writes of how the group focused on

"transforming relationships" by "searching for the dynamics of the relationships that cause the problems."

Effective Mediation: Track II practitioners often claim that neutral third-party mediators are far more suited to conduct sensitive negotiations than disputants themselves. Fisher writes that "in highly escalated and protracted conflict between identity groups, the involvement of an impartial and trusted third party is necessary to induce effective communication and creative problem solving" (2002: 62). Jones echoes the point, pointing out that while the United States often serves as a third-party mediator, U.S. officials tend to resist mediation when they are a disputant (Jones 2013). The claims by these practitioners are backed by some empirical evidence that neutral thirty mediation is effective in resolving international disputes (Kleiboer 1996; Gent and Shannon 2011).

Other researchers, however, maintain that non-neutral mediation may create consensus more effectively. Kydd (2003) argues that non-neutral mediators are effective because they are less likely to engage in cheap talk and will tell the truth in counseling parties who are on their side. Zartman (1995) observes that biased third parties have more leverage to compel allies into agreement, while Svensson (2009) argues that biased mediation is more likely to lead to lasting settlements in civil wars because neutral mediators have incentives to hasten the reaching of an agreement at the expense of its quality.

We have defined "effective" mediation as an output of Track II because assigning a mediator does not mean a priori that the participants will perceive the mediator as effective. Scholars could contribute to the debate on whether neutral mediation is more effective in dispute resolution by examining the relationship between individual or groups of moderators perceived as "neutral" or "biased" on Track II outputs, outcomes, or impacts.

Changing Perceptions: Practitioners view changed perceptions as an important result of Track II diplomacy. Kelman observes that "the hallmark of social interaction is that each participant tries to enter into the other's perspective and take the other's role, thus gaining an understanding of the other's concerns, expectations and intentions" (1996: 101). Through repeated interactions in Track II settings, disputants' perceptions of the conflict and each other may evolve in productive directions.

How might one measure these four outputs? The literature already cited in this paper offers several promising avenues, which we will merely summarize here. First, surveys represent a flexible way to measure outputs (Orr 1999: 4; Cook & Campbell 1979; Malhotra and Liyanage 2005). Yet our interviews reveal that practitioners still do not use them much of the time. With respect to generating ideas, for example, a survey could first ask participants *whether* a Track II dialogue generated any new ideas (a straightforward quantitative measure). It could then ask *which* new ideas emerged (a qualitative measure). To gauge changed perceptions, a "pre and post" survey could assess participants' views on key issues in a conflict both before and after the dialogue to determine if anything changed. We designed an example survey, included as **Appendix I**, which Track II facilitators could administer at minimal cost, satisfying their demand that evaluation not be too burdensome (objection #5).

Second, quasi-experimental methods using comparison groups or even experimental evaluation designs offer a rigorous way to measure outcomes (Baker 2000; Cook & Campbell 2002; Duflo, Gennester & Kremer 2004; Heckman & Vytlacil 2006). A handful of scholars have used these methods (Stern and Druckman 2000: 48-51). If several facilitators used a survey like the one in **Appendix 1**, for example, scholars could compare outputs, outcomes, and impacts when facilitators were perceived as "neutral" versus when they were not (Bohmelt 2011;

Svensson and Lindgren 2013; Lundgren and Svensson 2014; Svensson 2015). Although relatively large numbers of participants are needed to reach statistical power thresholds, methods do exist for generating experiment-like environments in small-n settings (White & Philips 2012). Researchers could conduct follow-up interviews several months (or even years) after the Track II activity ended to determine if it had lasting effects (Malhotra and Liyanage 2005). Doing so would confront the problem of fading impact (Beardsley 2008a, 2011) and address practitioners' concern about isolating the effects of Track II activities (obstacle #3). Conducting this type of quasi-experiment would be more expensive, but the fact that numerous scholars have already done it suggests that the costs are not insurmountable.

Third, focus groups and semi-structured interviews with participants can capture nuances that surveys often miss. A handful of Track II researchers have used this method to great effect (Cuhadar and Dayton 2012). For example, an interview might reveal that a particular interaction between two specific participants generated an idea which could be applied to policymaking. Or, an interview could elucidate ways in which neutral mediation prevented a contretemps among participants.

The use of surveys, focus groups, and some experimental or quasi-experimental techniques allows the evaluation of Track II outputs in a way that respects uniqueness but promotes generalization. Does the perception of moderators affect whether participants believed that new ideas emerged? Which of the four outputs described above transfer to the official policy-making process most often? Which types of ideas generated during Track II initiatives are least likely to emerge from official dialogues? Our framework allows the field to *begin* answering these kinds of questions.

Outcomes: Transfer to the Official Policy Process

Like Kelman (2008), Saunders (2011), and Fisher (2014), our framework assumes that the goal of Track II diplomacy is to transfer Track II outputs to the official policymaking process. These instances of successful transfer are labeled outcomes. (Some Track II activities may not use transfer as the desired outcome. Our framework could be adapted accordingly, although it might lose some of its analytical power). We identify four types of outcomes, although more could exist. *Official Participation/Observation* indicates that governmental negotiators personally participated in or observed a Track II activity, so the substance was instantly transmitted. This outcome includes private citizens participating in a dialogue and then later assuming official positions as negotiators. Take, for example, Robert Einhorn, Gary Samore, and Puneet Talwar, three Americans who participated in Track II dialogues with Iran and then served in the Obama administration (Jones 2014: 357).

Officials Informed Directly indicates that Track II participants informed governmental negotiators about Track II outputs after the dialogue ended. This outcome might entail written reports, oral briefings, or even informal emails.

Officials Informed Indirectly means that Track II participants provided outputs to key stakeholders – such as business groups or governmental officials not personally working on peace negotiations – and then those stakeholders in turn informed governmental negotiators.

Finally, *Officials Pressured Publicly* entails Track II participants going public with their outputs in an attempt to pressure governmental negotiators to adopt their ideas. This could include publishing reports or attracting press coverage.

As with our outputs, scholars might measure the outcomes we have identified in a variety of ways. An official's presence at a Track II dialogue is probably sufficient to infer that some

transfer has occurred. Process tracing, which might include interviewing policymakers and reviewing official documents, could uncover whether direct or indirect transfer occurred. Analysts could assess public pressure through interviews with officials, or less precisely through media analysis.

Again, different Track II initiatives could have varying transfer effects. Evaluators of specific initiatives should determine the particular transfer effects of that initiative. Nevertheless, there is space for comparative approaches to analyze the relationships, pathways, and causal mechanisms connecting the outputs to outcomes to impacts. Comparative approaches help answer questions such as, *Are certain types of transfer more common than others*? To our knowledge, the extant literature has not addressed this issue.

Impacts: Observed Behavior and Official Confirmation

Our framework understands impacts to mean instances of officials changing their behavior in response to the outcomes of Track II diplomacy. We do not define impacts as resolving conflict, which features far too many confounding factors.

Observed Behavior indicates that governmental peace negotiators are acting in ways consistent with outputs generated in Track II diplomacy. Relatedly, *Official Confirmation* indicates that governmental negotiators have confirmed that they thought or acted in a certain way because of something they learned from Track II diplomacy. Overall, impacts measure whether Track II diplomacy is influencing official peace processes.

It is difficult to envision scholars conducting an experimental design to measure Track II impacts. The process of determining governmental policy is simply too complex. However, detailed case studies could reveal a great deal about the impact of Track II on official processes. The bulk of this vital work will likely emerge from scholars who have the time and inclination to

reconstruct the past. Practitioners, on the other hand, will be too busy rushing off to mediate the next dispute.

Advantages of the Process Peace Framework

Our framework's conceptualization of outcomes and impacts offers several promising ways to mitigate practitioners' worries about isolating Track II effects and incorporating costs (objections #3 and #6, respectively), two shortcomings that no other framework addresses.

Our framework offers several ways to more closely examine processes of transfer in Track II diplomacy. For example, one could develop a study that compared elites who participate in Track II to those who do not to determine which group was more successful at transfer (after controlling for selection effects). This setup would better capture a dynamic invoked frequently by practitioners; namely; the idea that a series of Track II dialogues, unfolding over time, can create a critical mass of ideas and people that can change policy. Standard evaluation frameworks do not deal particularly well with multiple, overlapping interventions happening over time (Lechner and Miquel 2010), but the Process Peace framework offers a way to organize scholarly inquiry on this issue.

On incorporating costs, the challenge is how to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of Track II activities without overly commodifying them. The Process Peace framework offers several solutions that should encourage funders and facilitators to be more transparent about costs. For example, analysts could compare the general costs of transferring ideas to policymakers using various methods. Those methods might include: 1) Track II diplomacy, 2) hiring a lobbyist, 3) running a media campaign, 4) placing an op-ed in a major newspaper, or 5) meeting with a policymaker. These methods vary in terms of both cost and effectiveness. Using a lobbyist or paid advertising can easily cost over $10,000 per month, and policymakers may distrust ideas

delivered through these mediums. Publishing an op-ed offers a low-cost way to achieve transfer, but consider that the acceptance rate for op-eds in the *New York Times* is less than one percent and is highly contingent on the news cycle. Meeting with a policymaker is another low-cost option, but because policymakers prioritize building coalitions, they will be less swayed by an individual with ideas than by an individual with ideas *representing a group of influential Track II participants*.

Another way to incorporate costs using the Process Peace framework is for facilitators to study the effect of activities on outputs and outcomes systematically. To take an exaggerated hypothetical, does holding a Track II dialogue at a beautiful (and expensive) beachside resort consistently produce better outputs and outcomes than holding the dialogue in northern New Jersey? The answer may very well be "yes," since the environment may affect the formation of relationships and perceptions. However, this is something that practitioners and analysts should verify empirically, not take on good faith.

In sum, we believe that our Process Peace framework improves upon existing frameworks by better accommodating the six core objections voiced by practitioners. **Figure 3** compares the various frameworks across the six areas, demonstrating Process Peace' advantages.

Figure 3. "Process Peace" vs. Alternatives: Reconciling Practitioners' Six Core Objections

Practitioner Objection →	**Flexible measurement?**	**Comparable across cases?**	**Isolate effects?**	**Facilitator autonomy?**	**Conserve institutional capacity?**	**Incorporate costs?**
Multi-Step Framework	Yes	No	No	Yes	Maybe	No
Action Evaluation	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
D'Estrée Framework	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Process Peace	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Conclusion

This paper has proposed a new evaluation framework, Process Peace, which we believe better balances the equities of practitioners and scholars. One way or another, the field of Track II diplomacy will have to respond to the demand for more results-driven, evidence-based evaluation currently transforming the social sciences across a range of disciplines. We hope we have shown that this push for rigorous evaluation can be reconciled with the creative and flexible approaches that are the hallmark of Track II diplomacy.

The Process Peace framework is not the first, nor we hope the last, attempt to evaluate Track II diplomacy. In proposing this framework, we do not mean to impugn Track II practitioners, but rather to illustrate that evaluation offers an opportunity for practitioners, scholars, and funders to demonstrate Track II's effectiveness and learn more about how it works. We do not provide a "general theory" that accommodates every output, outcome, and impact. We also do not believe that every Track II initiative should be measured by the indicators we propose. We agree with practitioners that each Track II initiative is unique and ought to be evaluated on its own terms.

Nevertheless, scholars are already conducting comparative evaluations of Track II and we believe that they can and should produce even more. By specifying many important outputs, outcomes, and impacts of Track II, as well as the methods and stake-holders to analyze them, our framework adds to the debate over whether comparative approaches are possible, what they ought to measure, and who should conduct them.

Scholars still have much to learn about how, when, why, and under what conditions Track II succeeds in influencing conflict resolution. We do not know whether neutral mediation, non-neutral mediation, or other mediator characteristics build relationships, generate new ideas,

and transfer these ideas to policymakers. We do not know whether certain methods of transfer succeed more frequently in changing policy. We do not know whether the participation of high-level officials with more policy access, or mid-level officials with more time and flexibility, better achieves transfer effects, or if both groups have a comparative advantage at specific moments. None of these questions discredits the basic idea that many individual Track II initiatives are valuable for many reasons. Yet answering these types of questions would provide invaluable information about how dangerous conflicts end. Only a comparative perspective, like the one encapsulated in our Process Peace framework, can help scholars and practitioners attain this important knowledge.

Reference List

Agha, Hussein, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi, and Zeev Schiff (2003). *Track-II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Allen, Nathaniel, Rashad Badr, Chris Brown, Thomas Burns, Lindsay Einhaus, Kathleen Merkl, Mayank Misra, Travis Sharp, Seth Smith, Alexandra Utsey, and William Wagner (2014). *Bridging Divides: Track II Diplomacy in the Middle East.* Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School Policy Research Report.

Azar, Edward and John Burton, editors (1986). *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner.

Babbitt, Eileen F. (2009). "The Evolution of International Conflict Resolution: From Cold War to Peacebuilding." *Negotiation Journal* 25, 4: 539-549.

Bakaki, Zorzeta, Tobias Bohmelt, and Vincenzo Bove (2015). "Barriers to Coordination? Examining the Impact of Culture on International Mediation Occurrence and Effectiveness." *Political Studies* (forthcoming).

Baker, Judy (2000). *Evaluating the Impact of Development Projects on Poverty: A Handbook for Practitioners.* Washington, DC: Directions in Development, World Bank.

Ball, Desmond, Anthony Milner, and Brendan Taylor (2006). "Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific: Reflections and Future Directions." *Asian Security* 2, 3: 174-188.

Bartoli, Andrea (1999). "Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant'Egidio," in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, editors, *Herding Cats:*

Bass, Jossey, Heléne Clark, and Dana Taplin (2012). *Theory of Change Basics: A Primer on Theory of Change (PDF).* New York: Actknowledge.

Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Beardsley, Kyle (2008a). "Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems." *American Journal of Political Science* 52, 4: 723-740.

__________ (2008b). "New Approaches to Resolving Old Conflicts." *International Studies Review* 10, 3: 647-648.

__________ (2011). *The Mediation Dilemma*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Beber, Bernd (2012). "International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of Bias." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29, 4: 397-424.

Benz, Matthias (2009). “Entrepreneurship as a Non-Profit-Seeking Activity.” *International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal* 5, 1: 23-44.

Bercovitch, Jacob and Scott Sigmund Gartner (2006a). “Empirical Studies in International Mediation: Introduction to a Special Issue of *International Interactions*.” *International Interactions* 32, 4: 319-328.

__________ (2006b). “Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation.” *International Interactions* 32, 4: 329-354.

__________ (1993). “The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, 4: 670-691.

Bloom, Howard S., editor (2005). *Learning More from Social Experiments*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Böhmelt, Tobias (2011). “Disaggregating Mediations: The Impact of Multiparty Mediation.” *British Journal of Political Science* 41, 4: 859-881.

__________ (2009). “International Mediation and Social Networks: The Importance of Indirect Ties.” *International Interactions* 35, 3: 298-319.

__________ (2010). “The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third-Party Interventions.” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, 2: 167-178.

Brewer, Garry D. (1974). “The Policy Sciences Emerge: To Nurture and Structure a Discipline.” *Policy Sciences* 5, 3: 239-244.

Burton, John (1969). *Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations.* London: MacMillan.

Capie, David (2010). “When Does Track Two Matter? Structure, Agency and Asian Regionalism.” *Review of International Political Economy* 17, 2: 291-318.

Church, Cheyanne and Julie Shouldice (2002). *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play*. Derry/Londonberry, UK: Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity.

__________ (2003). *Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions, Part II: Emerging Practice and Theory.* Derry/Londonderry, UK: Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity.

Cook, Thomas D., Donald Thomas Campbell, and Arles Day (1979). *Quasi-Experimentation: Design & Analysis Issues for Field Settings.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Corell, Elisabeth and Michele M. Betsill (2008). “Analytical Framework: Assessing the Influence of NGO Diplomats,” in Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, editors, *NGO*

Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Cuhadar, Esra (2009). "Assessing Transfer from Track Two Diplomacy: The Cases of Water and Jerusalem." *Journal of Peace Research* 46, 5: 641-658.

Cuhadar, Esra and Bruce W. Dayton (2012). "Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy." *Negotiation Journal* 28, 2: 155-179.

Cuhadar Gurkaynak, Esra, Bruce Dayton, and Thania Paffenholz (2009). "Evaluation in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding," in Dennis J.D. Sandole, Sean Byrne, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste, and Jessica Senehi, editors, *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*. New York: Routledge.

Davidson, William D. and Joseph V. Montville (1981). "Foreign Policy According to Freud." *Foreign Policy* 45: 145-157.

D'Estrée, Tamra Pearson, Larissa A. Fast, Joshua N. Weiss, and Monica S. Jakobsen (2001). "Changing the Debate about 'Success' in Conflict Resolution Efforts." *Negotiation Journal* 17, 2: 101-113.

Diamond, Louise and John W. McDonald (1996). *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace.* West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

Doob, Leonard W. and William J. Foltz (1973). "The Belfast Workshop An Application of Group Techniques To a Destructive Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17, 3: 489-512.

Duflo, Esther, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer (2004). "Randomized Evaluations of Interventions in Social Science Delivery." *Development Outreach*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Egeland, Jan (1999). "The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson. and Pamela Aall, editors, *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Fast, Larissa A. and Reina C. Neufeldt (2005). "Envisioning Success: Building Blocks for Strategic and Comprehensive Peacebuilding Impact Evaluation." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 2, 2: 24-41.

Fearon, James D. (1994). "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38, 2: 236-269.

Fisher, Ronald J. (2006). "Coordination between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation." *International Negotiation* 11, 1: 65-89.

__________ (2002). “Historical Mapping of the Field of Interactive Conflict Resolution” in John Davies and Edward (Edy) Kaufman, editors, *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

__________ (2005). Editor. *Paving the Way: Contributions of Interactive Conflict Resolution to Peacemaking*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

________ (2014). “Transfer Effects from Track Two Diplomacy: Toward a Process and Outcome Model.” Paper presented at the workshop “Transfer and Track Two Diplomacy” at Stanford University. March 20-21, 2014.

Fitzgerald, Keith (2009). “Georgian Ossetian Joint Brainstorming” in David Smock, editor, *Private Peacemaking: USIP-Assisted Peacemaking Projects of Nonprofit Organizations.* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Funnell, Sue and Patricia Rogers (2011). *Purposeful Program Theory: Effective Use of Theories of Change and Logic Models*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Gent, Stephen E. and Megan Shannon (2011). “Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, 5: 710-734.

Goertz, Gary and James Mahoney (2012). *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Greig, Michael J. and Paul F. Diehl (2012). *International Mediation*. Cambridge: Polity.

Groves Rowley, Lori (2013). Email interview. September 27, 2013.

Haass, Richard N. (1990). *Conflicts Unending*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Hamilton, Barton H. (2000). “Does Entrepreneurship Pay? An Empirical Analysis of the Returns to Self-Employment.” *Journal of Political Economy* 108, 3: 604-631.

Heckman, James J. and E.J. Vytlacil (2006). “Econometric Evaluation of Social Programs” in James J. Heckman and Edward E. Leamer, editors, *Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 6*. Amsterdam: North Holland.

Hellman, Johan (2012). “The Occurrence of Mediation: A Critical Evaluation of the Current Debate.” *International Studies Review* 14, 4: 591-603.

Hirschfeld, Yair (2014). *Track-Two Diplomacy toward an Israeli-Palestinian Solution, 1978-2014*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Hottinger, Julian Thomas (2005). “The Relationship between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy,” in Robert Ricigliano, editor, *Choosing to Engage: Armed Groups and Peace Processes.* Accord 16. London: Conciliation Resources

Jones, Peter (2008). “Filling a Critical Gap, Or Just Wasting Time? Track Two Diplomacy and Regional Security in the Middle East.” *Disarmament Forum Vol. 2.* New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

________ (2013). Interview. October 7, 2013.

________ (2015). *Track Two Diplomacy: In Theory and Practice*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

________ (2014). “U.S.–Iran Nuclear Track Two from 2005 to 2011: What Have We Learned? Where Are We Going?” *Negotiation Journal* 30, 4: 347-366.

Kaye, Dalia Dassa (2007). *Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

________ (2013). Interview. October 21, 2013.

Kellen, David, Zvi Bekerman, and Ifat Maoz (2012). “An Easy Coalition: The Peacecamp Identity and Israeli–Palestinian Track Two Diplomacy.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57, 4: 543-569.

Kelman, Herbert C. (2008). “Evaluating the Contributions of Interactive Problem Solving to the Resolution of Ethnonational Conflicts.” *Peace and Conflict* 14, 1: 29-60.

________ (2000). “The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution." *International Studies Perspectives* 1, 3: 273-287.

________ (1996). “Negotiation as Interactive Problem Solving.” *International Negotiation* 1, 1: 99-123.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kleiboer, Marieke (1996). “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, 2: 360-389.

Koepke, Bruce (2013). Interview. October 30, 2013.

Kydd, Andrew (2003). “Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation.” *American Journal of Political Science* 47, 4: 597-611.

Lasswell, Harold D. (1956). *The Decision Process*. College Park: University of Maryland Press.

Lechner, Michael and Ruth Miquel (2010). "Identification of the Effects of Dynamic Treatments by Sequential Conditional Independence Assumptions." *Empirical Economics* 39, 1: 111-137.

Lieberfeld, Daniel (2002). "Evaluating the Contributions of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984-90." *Journal of Peace Research* 39, 3: 355-372.

________ (2007). "Promoting Tractability in South Africa and Israel/Palestine: The Role of Semiofficial Meetings." *American Behavioral Scientist* 50, 11: 1542-1562.

________ (1999). *Talking with the Enemy: Negotiation and Threat Perception in South Africa and Israel/Palestine*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Lundgren, Magnus and Isak Svensson (2014). "Leanings and Dealings: Exploring Bias and Trade Leverage in Civil War Mediation by International Organizations." *International Negotiation* 19, 2: 315-342.

MacDonald, John W. (2003). "Multi-Track Diplomacy" in Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, editors, *Beyond Intractability*. Boulder, CO: Conflict Information Consortium. Available at <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/multi-track-diplomacy>.

Malhotra, Deepak and Sumanasiri Liyanage (2005). "Long-Term Effects of Peace Workshops in Protracted Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, 6: 908-924.

Mintrom, Michael and Phillipa Norman (2009). "Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy Change." *Policy Studies Journal* 37, 4: 649-667.

Mitchell, Christopher R. (1980). "Evaluating Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 17, 1: 61-75.

Montville, Joseph V. (1987). "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," in J.W. McDonald and D.B. Bendahmane, editors, *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

________ (2006). "Track Two Diplomacy: The Work of Healing History." *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 7, 2: 15-25.

________ (2013). Interview. September 23, 2013.

National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1978). *The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research.* DHEW Publication No. (OS) 78-0012. Available at <http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/belmont.html>.

NORAD (1999). *The Logical Framework Approach: Handbook for Objectives-Oriented Planning*. Fourth Edition. Oslo: Norwegian Development Cooperation.

Oetzel, John G. and Stella Ting-Toomey (2006). *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Communication: Integrating Theory, Research, and Practice.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Orr, Larry L. (1999). *Social Experiments: Evaluating Public Programs with Experimental Methods.* London: Sage Publications.

Paffenholz, Thania and Luc Reychler (2005). "Towards Better Policy and Programme Work in Conflict Zones: Introducing the 'Aid for Peace' Approach." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 2, 2: 6-23.

Parsons, Jim, Caitlin Gokey, and Monica Thornton (2013). *Indicators of Inputs, Activities, Outputs, Outcomes, and Impacts in Security and Justice Programming*. New York: Vera Institute of Justice.

Pedersen, Jon (2013). Interview. October 28, 2013.

Phillips, David L. (2005). *Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Ross, Marc H. (2001). "Action Evaluation in the Theory and Practice of Conflict Resolution." *Peace and Conflict Studies* 8, 1: 1-15.

Rossi, Peter H., Mark W. Lipsey, and Howard E. Freeman (1999). *Evaluation: A Systematic Approach*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Rothman, Jay (1997). "Action-Evaluation and Conflict Resolution: In Theory and Practice." *Mediation Quarterly* 15, 2: 119-131.

Rothman, Jay and Victor J. Friedman (2002). "Action Evaluation for Conflict Management Organizations and Projects" in John Davies and Edward (Edy) Kaufman, editors, *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Rouhana, Nadim N. (1995). "Unofficial Third - Party Intervention in International Conflict: Between Legitimacy and Disarray." *Negotiation Journal* 1, 3: 255-270.

________ (2000). "Interactive Conflict Resolution: Issues in Theory, Methodology and Evaluation" in Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, editors, *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Saunders, Harold H. (2003). "Sustained Dialogue in Managing Intractable Conflict." *Negotiation Journal* 19, 1: 85-95.

________ (2013). Interview. September 30, 2013.

________ (2011). *Sustained Dialogue in Conflicts: Transformation and Change*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Saunders, Harold, Louise Diamond, Herbert C. Kelman, John Marks, Joseph V. Montville, and Vamık Volkan. (2000). "Interactive Conflict Resolution: A View for Policymakers on Making and Building Peace" in Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, editors, *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War.* Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Schmidt, Terry (2009). *Strategic Project Management Made Simple: Practical Tools for Leaders and Teams.* Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Online.

Schneider, Mark, Paul Teske, and Michael Mintrom (1995). *Public Entrepreneurs: Agents for Change in American Government*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Shadish, William R., Thomas D. Cook, and Donald T. Campbell (2002). *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Sharp, Travis (2013). "Loose Change: U.S. Spending on Track II Diplomacy." Working Paper. Princeton University.

Smock, David (2009). *Private Peacemaking: USIP-Assisted Peacemaking Projects of Nonprofit Organizations.* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Stedman, Stephen J. (1991). *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.

Stern, Paul C. and Daniel Druckman (2000). "Evaluating Interventions in History: The Case of International Conflict Resolution." *International Studies Review* 2, 1: 33-63.

Svensson, Isak (2015). *International Mediation Bias and Peacemaking: Taking Sides in Civil Wars*. New York: Routledge.

________ (2013). "Peace from the Inside: Exploring the Role of the Insider-Partial Mediator." *International Interactions* 39, 5: 698-722.

________ (2009). "Who Brings Which Peace? Neutral versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, 3: 446-469.

Themnér, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen (2013). "Armed Conflicts 1946–2012." *Journal of Peace Research* 50, 4: 509–521.

Van Evera, Stephen (1997). *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Waage, Hilde (2013). Interview. October 29, 2013.

Wallensteen, Peter and Isak Svensson (2014). "Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts." *Journal of Peace Research* 51, 2: 315-327.

Walton, Richard E. (1970). "A Problem-Solving Workshop on Border Conflicts in Eastern Africa." *Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences* 6, 4: 453-489.

Weible, Christopher M. (2014). "Introducing the Scope and Focus of Policy Process Research and Theory," in Paul A. Sabatier and Christipher M. Weible, editors, *Theories of the Policy Process*. Third Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

White, Howard and Daniel Phillips (2012). "Addressing Attribution of Cause and Effect in Small-n Impact Evaluations: Towards an Integrated Framework." New Delhi: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, Kathleen Young, Victor Asal, and David Quinn (2003). "Mediating International Crises: Cross-National and Experimental Perspectives." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, 3: 279-301.

Wood, Elisabeth J. (2006). "The Ethical Challenges of Field Research in Conflict Zones." *Qualitative Sociology* 29, 3: 307-341.

Zahariadis, Nikolaos (2014). "Ambiguity and Multiple Streams," in Paul A. Sabatier and Christipher M. Weible, editors, *Theories of the Policy Process*, Third Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Zartman, William I. (1985). *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.

________ (1995). *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Appendix 1. Example of Track II Evaluation Survey

Adapted from Allen, Sharp et al (2014)

Track 2 Diplomacy Mini-Survey

Thank you for agreeing to Take Part in the Track 2 Diplomacy Mini-Survey being conducted by Princeton University in collaboration with the facilitators/organizers of Track 2 meetings you have attended. We ask you to complete a brief series of questions that will help assess the degree to which Track 2 dialogue efforts are successful in achieving their goals. The survey does not ask you to reveal any personal information, and therefore your answers will remain anonymous. Your participation in this survey is voluntary, and you may choose to skip or not answer questions if you wish. However, the feedback is very important for the facilitators/organizers, and thus we encourage you to be complete and honest in your answers, as the results of this survey will help to improve the effectiveness of Track 2 dialogue efforts.

If you have any questions, comments, or concerns you may contact Evan Evaluator at ev@eval.edu.

General Track 2 Evaluation

This section asks broad questions about your experience with Track 2 initiatives in general

1. **Approximately how many individual Track 2 dialogue meetings have you attended?**
   Fill in the number

   ____

2. **On which subject(s) have you participated in Track 2 dialogue initiatives?**
   Check all that apply
   Check all that apply.

   - [ ] Arab / Israeli conflict
   - [ ] Iran
   - [ ] Gulf regional security
   - [ ] Weapons of mass destruction
   - [ ] Arab Spring
   - [ ] Egypt Uprisings
   - [ ] Syrian Civil War
   - [ ] War in Afghanistan
   - [ ] War in Iraq
   - [ ] Other: ______________________

3. **In general, how effective do you feel Track 2 dialogue initiatives are in helping to resolve conflict?**
Mark only one oval.

- Very effective
- Moderately effective
- Somewhat effective
- Not effective

4. **In general, how effective did you expect Track 2 dialogue initiatives to be in helping to resolve conflict prior to participating in Track 2?**
Mark only one oval.

- Very effective
- Moderately effective
- Somewhat effective
- Not effective

5. **How often do Track 2 initiatives help participants or elites from opposing sides in a conflict gain understanding of the issues, concerns, and behaviors of one another?**
Mark only one oval.

- Never
- Often
- Sometimes
- Occasionally

6. **How often do Track 2 initiatives help societies from opposing sides in a conflict gain understanding of the issues, concerns, and behaviors of one another?**
Mark only one oval.

- Often
- Sometimes
- Occasionally
- Never

7. **How often have ideas generated in Track 2 initiatives you have participated in been made known to policymakers?**
Mark only one oval.

- Never
- Often
- Sometimes
- Occasionally

9. **How often do Track 2 initiatives help to generate trust and foster healthy working relationships among participants on opposing sides in a conflict?**
Mark only one oval.

- Often
- Sometimes
- Occassionally
- Never

10. **How important do you feel the presence of a third-party mediator is to ensuring the success of Track 2 dialogue initiatives?**
Mark only one oval.

- Very important
- Important
- Somewhat important
- Not important

11. **Have you every taken part in a Track 2 dialogue initiative that you feel did not succeed?**
Mark only one oval.

- Yes
- No

12. **If so, why did you feel the initiative was unsuccessful?**
Check all that apply
Check all that apply.

- [ ] Ineffective mediator
- [ ] Did not translate into policy
- [ ] Did not generate an atmosphere of trust and understanding among participants
- [ ] Information was leaked to the press
- [ ] The conflict was not ripe for dialogue
- [ ] Participants who did not play a constructive role
- [ ] Other: ______________________

Most Recent Track 2 Experience

This section asks you questions about your most recent Track 2 experience

13. **On which subject was the most recent Track 2 dialogue in which you took part?**

Check all that apply

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Arab / Israeli conflict
- [ ] Iran
- [ ] Gulf regional security
- [ ] Weapons of mass destruction
- [ ] Arab Spring
- [ ] Egypt Uprisings
- [ ] Syrian Civil War
- [ ] War in Afghanistan
- [ ] War in Iraq
- [ ] Other: ______________________

14. **In which Track 2 initiative did you most recently take part?**

Choose one

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) UCLA Track II
- ( ) Other: ______________________

15. **How successful was the most recent Track 2 dialogue initiative in which you took part?**

Mark only one oval.

- ( ) Very successful
- ( ) Successful
- ( ) Limited Success
- ( ) Unsuccessful

16. **What, if any, factors contributed to the success of the initiative?**

Check all that apply

Check all that apply.

- [ ] Had a direct policy impact
- [ ] Succeeded in helping elites from opposing sides gain understanding of the issues, concerns, and behaviors of one another
- [ ] Helped to generate trust and foster positive working relationships among participants
- [ ] Effective mediator
- [ ] Succeeded in helping societies from opposing sides gain understanding of the issues, concerns, and behaviors of one another
- [ ] Other: ______________________

17. **What, if any, factors did not contribute to the success of the initiative?**
Check all that apply
Check all that apply.

- [ ] Ineffective mediator
- [ ] Did not translate into policy
- [ ] Did not generate an atmosphere of trust and understanding among participants
- [ ] Information was leaked to the press
- [ ] The conflict was not ripe for dialogue
- [ ] Participants who did not play a constructive role
- [ ] Other: ____________________

18. **Please provide any comments or feedback you might have that to the facilitator of the most recent Track 2 initiative in which you participated that you feel might help to improve future efforts**

____
____
____
____
____

19. **Please provide any comments or feedback you might have that might prove the effectiveness of Track 2 efforts in general.**

____
____
____
____
____